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Surrogate Motherhood:
Legal Issues Concerning 'Vanity Children'
James Michael Thunder

Mr. Thunder is the general counsel of the Americans United for Life
Legal Defense Fund, Chicago , Illinois . This paper was presented to the
Department of Pediatrics of the Loyola University Stritch School of
Medicine in April of 1988.

Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund (AUL), for whom I am
general counsel, has a limited institutional interest in the practice of
surrogate motherhood. A UL is the legal arm of the pro-life movement in
the United States and has institutional positions on abortion, euthanasia,
fetal experimentation and infanticide. With respect to surrogacy, A UL
opposes any agreement, or any law which would recognize any agreement,
that would require abortion by the surrogate mother. Everything else I
present here is my personal view.
My background on this issue includes my experience as an assistant
state's attorney for Cook County in the Child Abuse and Neglect Unit of
the Juvenile Division of Circuit Court where I participated in cases in
which parental rights were terminated. It also includes the publication of
an essay in The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin in August, 1987, testifying at
the Illinois Senate committee hearings last fall, and attending the
deliberations of a committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws this past February.
First, let me define surrogate motherhood. It is an agreement by a
woman made before conception to give birth to a child and to terminate
her maternal rights in favor of another person (probably a woman) at, or
soon after, birth. Since it is an agreement made before, rather than after,
conception, it is materially different from the typical situation of an unwed
mother who wishes to place her unborn child for adoption . Now, let us
look at the issues such an arrangement poses.
Who is the Mother Legally
The law provides that the mother of a child is the woman who gave birth
to the child . (Moreover, ifthe mother is married, the father is presumed to
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be her husband. The presumption can be rebutted - as it would be in the
case of artificial insemination ofthe woman by a man not her husband .) A
contract for surrogacy seeks to change what the law would normally
provide. Of course, the law recognizes that agreements can change what
would otherwise be provided by the law in numerous fields of endeavor.
Thus, commercial contracts can vary what would otherwise be provided
by the Uniform Commercial Code, and wills can vary what the law would
otherwise provide in cases of intestacy. There are, however, limits to these
arrangements. Certain arrangements can be determined to be contrary to
statute or to public policy.
So it is that surrogacy contracts have been ruled invalid and
unenforceable - by a trial court in Michigan and , in the case of Baby M,
by the highest court in New Jersey. (In re Baby M. Feb. 3, 1988). Where the
surrogacy contract is unenforceable , the result is that a court must
determine the identity of the mother (an easy matter) and the identity of
the father (the hus band of the mother or perhaps the donor of semen). The
court must then adjudicate the matter of custody between mother and
father. If, as in the Baby M case, there is a woman who desired to be the
child's mother, the woman's role in the custody dispute is simply as a
prospective stepmother.
In the Baby M case, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a
surrogacy contract violated three New Jersey statutes. It violated
- statutes which prohibit the use of money in connection with
adoption;
- statutes which limit termination of parental rights to situations in
which there has been a valid surrender of the child to an appropriate
agency or in which there has been a showing of parental unfitness or
abandonment of the child ; and
- statutes which allow the revocation of a mother's consent to
surrender her child in a private placement adoption.
The court further found that the surrogacy contract violated five public
policies of New Jersey, namely:
- the policy that custody be awarded in accordance with the best
interests of the child , whereas the surrogacy contract made that
determination before the child was born;
- the policy that children be brought up by their natural parents,
whereas the surrogacy contract guaranteed the separation of the child
from his or her natural mother;
- the policy that the rights of the natural father and natural mother are
equal, whereas the surrogacy contract enhanced the natural father's right
by destroying the natural mother's right;
- the policy that a natural mother receive counseling before
consenting to surrender her child, whereas the surrogacy contract made no
such provision; and
- the policy that adoptions not be influenced by the payment of
money, whereas the surrogacy contract was based on such payment.
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This decision only voided the surrogacy contract in this case and ones
similar to it in New Jersey. It remains possible for the New Jersey
legislature, as well as legislatures in other states , to pass laws that would
allow surrogacy. A number of legislatures, including Illinois , have bills
before them which would make certain, well-defined surrogacy contracts
enforceable. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws is drafting "model" legislation, as is the American Bar
Association. In addition , proponents of surrogacy may amend their form
surrogacy contracts to meet at least some of the objections of the New
Jersey Supreme Court - to render them less obnoxious in the view of
other courts around the country.
A Policy and Moral Question

The very first question is not a legal question at all , but a policy and
moral question: Why should we allow any surrogacy arrangements? The
argument in favor is that there is a "market demand" for the arrangement.
The argument is as follows: There are infertile couples. These couples
desire to have children , and surrogacy is the only way they can have
children. Let's examine this argument for a minute.
Of course there are infertile couples. And I sympathize with them. As I
stated to the Illinois Senate subcommittee considering surrogacy bills, I
know their plight - and I know thejoy of having children. Yet, there have
always been infertile couples, so what is new? Certainly, there is no new
technological advance involved in surrogacy arrangements . The technological means is artificial insemination - but that method of achieving
pregnancy has been around for at least three decades.
What is new is the "short supply" of children available for adoption. Yet ,
it is not that there are no children available for adoption. What is new is
that there are so few children who are infants, healthy and white who are
available for adoption . This , too , is not due to any technological change,
but rather to a change in the law on abortion - perhaps a foreseeable
effect of Roe v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court decision outlawing
criminal prohibitions by the states of all abortions throughout all nine
months of pregnancy. There are , in fact, many children who are
handicapped or non-white or not infants or who belong to sibling groups
available for adoption . Indeed, I have a friend who just adopted four
brothers and sisters between the ages of 5 and 12.
Besides the prevalence of abortion, what is new today is that infertile
couples want what I call a "vanity child". I do not employ this term to
shame the child born of such an arrangement. I use it as a shorthand
expression to describe the kind of couple who would use surrogacy to get
what they want. This kind of couple does not simply want a child. The
child this couple seeks must be genetically linked to them; the couple places
an extremely high value on their genes . Moreover, this couple would
attempt to utilize whatever devices were available to ensure that a
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surrogate arrangement resulted only in a child they wanted, that is, a
healthy child. Thus arises the spectre of compelling abortion of
undesirable children conceived through surrogacy.
The desire of an infertile couple to obtain a child through surrogacy
springs from the same desire of a woman to abort her unborn child . These
people all have needs which they want met regardless of the consequences
to them, to the children and to society.
Surrogacy and Christian Principles
Since I am writing for a publication of Catholic physicians, permit me to
reflect on surrogacy in light of Christian principles. Christians can never
place the human desire to rear genetically linked children on the highest of
planes . First, we ourselves are adopted sons and daughters of God . We
therefore recognize the importance of adoption in our own lives. Second,
our fathers and mothers in Faith are not all genetically linked to us . We
owe a huge debt to all predecessors be they mothers, fathers, godparents,
confessors , or Abraham and Sarah. Third, Catholics place a high value on
celibacy, that is, the grace to renounce the human desire to have genetically
linked children in favor of doing the Lord's work. Fourth, we know what
societal disruption can result when the human desire to have genetically
linked children is given too high a value. It was, if you will recall, the cause
of Henry VIII seeking a divorce. This led, in turn, to the martyrdom of St.
Thomas More and the schism between the Anglican and Catholic
Churches .
Father Clements's adoption of three boys is not merely a great
charitable act. He has given witness to the value of adoption in the life of
every Christian.
Now I will return to my worldly analysis of surrogacy.
What is the urgency of this legislation? With all of the other problems
besetting this country, why must grown men and women spend hours
debating this issue and the precise terms of legislation? Is it that legislators
are particularly keen about ensuring legislative regulation in advance of
any judicial rulings? (If so, there are numerous areas warranting such
legislative attention.) I hypothesize that legislators just want to be viewed
as liberal and compassionate.
Let's take a look at the issues that consume these legislative drafting
committees. They are too numerous to admit of extended discussion
today. So I will just raise the issues for you.
Eligibility
-of the Intended Parent(s)
First, who can avail themselves of the surrogacy arrangement?
Could a single man? Could a single woman? If it is limited to couples, is
there a constitutional violation of a single person's right to procreate?
After all , a single woman can be artificially inseminated and single people
can adopt.
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Must the single person or couple be infertile? If so, has not an alleged
constitutional right of fertile couples to procreate by any means
technologically possible been denied them?
How should infertility be defined? According to one Illinois bill, it
would be enough to allege that a couple has attempted to establish
pregnancy for one year or more. (According to those drafting the uniform
state law on surrogacy, more than 10% of all couples would meet this
definition of infertility.) How would a couple establish in a verifiable way
which protected their privacy that they had tried to establish pregnancy for
a period of at least a year?
Could the couple be said to be infertile where the man or woman had
been voluntarily sterilized at one time, but now wish to have a child?
Would it be enough for the woman to show that she could bear a child ,
but that such a child would probably have a genetic deformity, or that
bearing a child would harm her mental health? How would such harm be
established?
Would the couple have to establish that they were using surrogacy only
as a last resort, that is, that they had tried unsuccessfully other means of
procreation or that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, such
other means would be unsuccessful?
Would an older couple be able to qualify on the basis that the woman is
past menopause? Would it make a difference if the couple had never tried
to have children when the woman was younger?
Must the couple be genetically linked to the child? That is, must either
the man donate his sperm (as in the Baby M case) or the woman donate her
egg? Couldn't the egg come from one person, the sperm from another, the
baby from the surrogate's womb, and then have custody of the baby given
to a fourth person?
Should the couple be screened for genetic deformities, and evaluated for
fitness as parents?
Eligibility
-of the Surrogate
Second, how would a woman qualify to be a surrogate?
Must the surrogate have demonstrated the ability to conceive and bear a
child - a healthy child, without complications during the pregnancy?
Must the surrogate have demonstrated her ability to detach herself
emotionally from her child by perhaps having placed a child for adoption
once before? Or could she prove it through a psychological examination?
Must the surrogate have demonstrated that there would be no harmful
impact on her husband or her children? What provision should be made
for her husband and children if there are complications, indeed if
permanent disability or death results? Should the surrogate be given health
insurance , life insurance, disability insurance? What is the effect on her
children if she is pregnant for nine months and does not bring the baby
home or brings it home and then releases it?
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Must the surrogate be of a certain age to ensure she understands the
arrangement? Must she be of a minimum and maximum age to ensure a
healthy pregnancy and child?
Other Issues

Once it is established that the parties are qualified to enter into a
surrogacy arrangement, there are other issues.
I. Can the surrogate recant and reclaim her child ? When can she do so
- only before birth? For a limited time after birth?
2. Can the surrogate be paid ? Should there be a minimum or a
maximum fee? How should it be paid - in installments? What conditions
must be met by the surrogate, or the unborn child , before any payments
are made? Should the payments be made directly to the surrogate, or held
in escrow until "title" to the child has passed?
3. To what extent can the intended parents manage the pregnancy of
the surrogate? Can she be prevented from skiing? from smoking? from
aborting?
4. Who has parental responsibility if the child dies before birth, or is
born handicapped , or if one or both of the intended parents should die or
become incapacitated, or if the intended parents should divorce during the
surrogate's pregnancy? One la wyer suggests making all parties involved in
non-natural reproductions liable as parents - including medical
personnel.
5. And now a true legal question : What state's laws apply to the iss ues if
the surrogacy contract was in one state, but the intended parents live in a
second state and the surrogate lives in a third?
6. Which of these problems should be addressed by the legislature in a
statute - and which should be left for the parties to decide?
7. Must health insurers pay for surrogate arrangements as they do for
medical procedures to correct infertility? Must health insurance
subscribers pay for other subscribers' surrogate arrangements?
8. To what extent do we want judicial involvement in this arrangement?
Do we want a judge to review the surrogacy contract and advise a
surrogate in open court of her duties and rights? Do we want a judge to get
involved only when there is a dispute? Do we understand that society pays
the costs of any judicial involvement?
You will note how few of these issues are strictly legal ones. The
particular issues, just like the issue of surrogacy in general, are principally
moral and policy questions .
You may also observe that only the very rich could take advantage of
surrogate arrangements. They cost over $25,000 - many times the costs
associated with an adoption . Yet it will be mostly the poor who will offer
their wombs as surrogates. When liberal-minded legislators say they feel
compassion for infertile couples, where is their compassion for the
prospective surrogate women?
There I are numerous instances where our laws serve to protect people
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from unwittingly consenting to harmful activity. So, even if a woman
wants to act as a surrogate, and wants to do so for altruistic purposes
rather than financial gain, should we let her? We don't allow girls to
consent to intercourse. We don't let people take certain drugs. We don't let
women perform intercourse for money. Should we not say, as a matter of
law, that a woman cannot consent to letting her body be used to conceive a
child for someone other than herself and her spouse?
Where, too, is the legislators' compassion for the child born of such an
arrangement? Of course there are problems which inevitably arise with
children and their parents. Our laws and courts handle them every day as
best they can. Neither the laws nor the courts can render less-than-perfect
situations perfect. For example, divorces will occur, there will be children
involved, and the judges must do the best they can to resolve custody
Issues.
Yet, why should the law provide for surrogacy? Why place any child at
risk solely to satisfy the vanities of adults - the risk of having a contested
identity? the risk of having a contested custody hearing? the risk inherent
in finding out the identities of one's natural parents and the arrangement
by which one was conceived and born? the risk of being rejected by all the
parties involved?
Why should we emasculate our present laws, which clearly serve the
best interests of children, in order to serve the selfish interests of an
infertile couple? Why should we help the rich at the expense of the bodies
of the poor?
Must the law accommodate our every desire? Legislators restrict our
selfishness in many varied ways. Let me cite environmental regulations
just as one example . Why is it that the law should accommodate this
particular desire and this specific mode of satisfying the desire?
Some say it is because people have a constitutional right to privacy and
this right encompasses the constitutional right to procreate by any means ,
including surrogacy.
Only Married Have Right to Procreate
I respond, first, that only married couples have the constitutional right
to procreate. No one else , as a matter of constitutional/aw, has or should
have the right to engage in procreative activity. Thus, the states may
proscribe premarital sexual relations (that is, fornication) and extramarital sexual relations (that is , adultery). This view is supported by the
history and traditions of the American people - one of the criteria used
by the Supreme Court in determining the parameters of the constitutional
right to privacy.
Second, married couples have the constitutional right to procreate
solely by natural coitus. This method of procreation is grounded in this
history and traditions of our people and no doubt is protected by the
constitutional right to privacy. This method is eminently private, since no
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third person is a party to the act. Any other means, including artificial
insemination, is not grounded in the history and traditions of our people
and , inasmuch as it requires a third party, is most definitely not private.
So, in my view, a legislature could ban any non-natural method of
reproduction. (I am mindful that, with respect to married persons, it is
extremely unlikely that any such statutory prohibition would be enacted.)
Whatever one's views on the constitutional right of non-married persons
to procreate or the right to utilize non-natural means of reproduction, they
ought not to form the basis for a constitutional analysis of surrogacy. This
is because surrogacy, as recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court, is
not a means of procreation. The aspects of surrogacy arrangements
concerning coitus or artificial insemination and the resulting pregnancy
are indeed activities of procreation. Yet surrogacy arrangements are first
and foremost arrangements for the pre-conception termination of parental
rights and the pre-conception adoption of a child by one who is not his or
her natural parent. Thus, surrogacy arrangements are arrangements of
adoption, not procreation.
Adoptions, as we all know , are not provided by constitutional right, but
through legislative privilege. So, surrogacy arrangements are not required
to be enforced as a matter of constitutional law, but may be allowed as a
matter of legislative grace. If adoption were a matter of constitutional
right, then one could be entitled to a child. The child becomes an object to
which one is entitled. Such a view contradicts the human dignity of
children as persons.
In sum , legislators can constitutionally prohibit surrogacy arrangements . They should do so.
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